Home > Dissension Grows In Senior Ranks On War Strategy
By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer
Deep divisions are emerging at the top of the U.S. military
over the course of the occupation of Iraq with some senior
officers beginning to say that the United States faces the
prospect of casualties for years without achieving its goal
of establishing a free and democratic Iraq.
Their major worry is that the United States is prevailing
militarily but failing to win the support of the Iraqi
people. That view is far from universal, but it is spreading
and being voiced publicly for the first time.
Army Maj. Gen. Charles H. Swannack Jr., the commander of the
82nd Airborne Division, who spent much of the year in western
Iraq, said he believes that at the tactical level at which
fighting occurs, the U.S. military is still winning. But when
asked whether he believes the United States is losing, he
said, "I think strategically, we are."
Army Col. Paul Hughes, who last year was the first director
of strategic planning for the U.S. occupation authority in
Baghdad, said he agrees with that view and noted that a
pattern of winning battles while losing a war characterized
the U.S. failure in Vietnam. "Unless we ensure that we have
coherency in our policy, we will lose strategically," he said
in an interview Friday.
"I lost my brother in Vietnam," added Hughes, a veteran Army
strategist who is involved in formulating Iraq policy. "I
promised myself, when I came on active duty, that I would do
everything in my power to prevent that [sort of strategic
loss] from happening again. Here I am, 30 years later,
thinking we will win every fight and lose the war, because we
don’t understand the war we’re in."
The emergence of sharp differences over U.S. strategy has set
off a debate, a year after the United States ostensibly won a
war in Iraq, about how to preserve that victory. The core
question is how to end a festering insurrection that has
stymied some reconstruction efforts, made many Iraqis feel
less safe and created uncertainty about who actually will run
the country after the scheduled turnover of sovereignty June
30.
Inside and outside the armed forces, experts generally argue
that the U.S. military should remain there but should change
its approach. Some argue for more troops, others for less,
but they generally agree on revising the stated U.S. goals to
make them less ambitious. They are worried by evidence that
the United States is losing ground with the Iraqi public.
Some officers say the place to begin restructuring U.S.
policy is by ousting Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld,
whom they see as responsible for a series of strategic and
tactical blunders over the past year. Several of those
interviewed said a profound anger is building within the Army
at Rumsfeld and those around him.
A senior general at the Pentagon (news - web sites) said he
believes the United States is already on the road to defeat.
"It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this," he said.
"The American people may not stand for it — and they should
not."
Asked who was to blame, this general pointed directly at
Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz. "I
do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end
state and exit strategy before we commenced our invasion," he
said. "Had someone like Colin Powell (news - web sites) been
the chairman [of the Joint Chiefs of Staff], he would not
have agreed to send troops without a clear exit strategy. The
current OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] refused to
listen or adhere to military advice."
Like several other officers interviewed for this report, this
general spoke only on the condition that his name not be
used. One reason for this is that some of these officers deal
frequently with the senior Pentagon civilian officials they
are criticizing, and some remain dependent on top officials
to approve their current efforts and future promotions. Also,
some say they believe that Rumsfeld and other top civilians
punish public dissent. Senior officers frequently cite what
they believe was the vindictive treatment of then-Army Chief
of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki after he said early in 2003
that the administration was underestimating the number of
U.S. troops that would be required to occupy postwar Iraq.
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s No. 2 official, said he does not
think the United States is losing in Iraq, and said no senior
officer has expressed that thought to him, either. "I am sure
that there are some out there" who think that, he said in an
interview yesterday afternoon.
"There’s no question that we’re facing some difficulties,"
Wolfowitz said. "I don’t mean to sound Pollyannaish — we all
know that we’re facing a tough problem." But, he said, "I
think the course we’ve set is the right one, which is moving
as rapidly as possible to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi
self-defense."
Wolfowitz, who is widely seen as the intellectual architect
of the Bush administration’s desire to create a free and
democratic Iraq that will begin the transformation of the
politics of the Middle East, also strongly rejected the idea
of scaling back on that aim. "The goal has never been to win
the Olympic high jump in democracy," he said. Moving toward
democratization in Iraq will take time, he said. Yet, he
continued, "I don’t think the answer is to find some old
Republican Guard generals and have them impose yet another
dictatorship in an Arab country."
The top U.S. commander in the war also said he strongly
disagrees with the view that the United States is heading
toward defeat in Iraq. "We are not losing, militarily," Army
Gen. John Abizaid said in an interview Friday. He said that
the U.S. military is winning tactically. But he stopped short
of being as positive about the overall trend. Rather, he
said, "strategically, I think there are opportunities."
The prisoner abuse scandal and the continuing car bombings
and U.S. casualties "create the image of a military that’s
not being effective in the counterinsurgency," he said. But
in reality, "the truth of the matter is . . . there are some
good signals out there."
Abizaid cited the resumption of economic reconstruction and
the political progress made with Sunni Muslims in resolving
the standoff around Fallujah, and increasing cooperation from
Shiite Muslims in isolating radical Shiite cleric Moqtada
Sadr. "I’m looking at the situation, and I told the secretary
of defense the other day I feel pretty comfortable with where
we are," he said.
Even so, he said, "There’s liable to be a lot of fighting in
May and June," as the June 30 date for turning over
sovereignty to an Iraqi government approaches.
Commanders on the ground in Iraq seconded that cautiously
optimistic view.
"I am sure that the view from Washington is much worse than
it appears on the ground here in Baqubah," said Army Col.
Dana J.H. Pittard, commander of a 1st Infantry Division
brigade based in that city about 40 miles north of Baghdad.
"I do not think that we are losing, but we will lose if we
are not careful." He said he is especially worried about
maintaining political and economic progress in the provinces
after the turnover of power.
Army Lt. Col. John Kem, a battalion commander in Baghdad,
said that the events of the past two months — first the
eruption of a Shiite insurgency, followed by the detainee
abuse scandal — "certainly made things harder," but he said
he doubted they would have much effect on the long-term
future of Iraq.
But some say that behind those official positions lies deep
concern.
One Pentagon consultant said that officials with whom he
works on Iraq policy continue to put on a happy face
publicly, but privately are grim about the situation in
Baghdad. When it comes to discussions of the administration’s
Iraq policy, he said, "It’s ’Dead Man Walking.’ "
The worried generals and colonels are simply beginning to say
what experts outside the military have been saying for weeks.
In mid-April, even before the prison detainee scandal, Peter
Galbraith, a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, wrote in the
New York Review of Books that "patience with foreign
occupation is running out, and violent opposition is
spreading. Civil war and the breakup of Iraq are more likely
outcomes than a successful transition to a pluralistic
Western-style democracy." The New York Review of Books is not
widely read in the U.S. military, but the article, titled
"How to Get Out of Iraq," was carried online and began
circulating among some military intellectuals.
Likewise, Rep. John P. Murtha (Pa.), a former Marine who is
one of most hawkish Democrats in Congress, said last week:
"We cannot prevail in this war as it is going today," and
said that the Bush administration should either boost its
troop numbers or withdraw.
Larry Diamond, who until recently was a senior political
adviser of the U.S. occupation authority in Iraq, argued that
the United States is not losing the war but is in danger of
doing so. "I think that we have fallen into a period of real
political difficulty where we are no longer clearly winning
the peace, and where the prospect of a successful transition
to democracy is in doubt.
"Basically, it’s up in the air now," Diamond continued.
"That’s what is at stake. . . . We can’t keep making tactical
and strategic mistakes."
He and others are recommending a series of related revisions
to the U.S. approach.
Like many in the Special Forces, defense consultant Michael
Vickers advocates radically trimming the U.S. presence in
Iraq, making it much more like the one in Afghanistan (news -
web sites), where there are 20,000 troops and almost none in
the capital, Kabul. The U.S. military has a small presence in
the daily life of Afghans. Basically, it ignores them and
focuses its attention on fighting pockets of Taliban and al
Qaeda holdouts. Nor has it tried to disarm the militias that
control much of the country.
In addition to trimming the U.S. troop presence, a young Army
general said, the United States also should curtail its
ambitions in Iraq. "That strategic objective, of a free,
democratic, de-Baathified Iraq, is grandiose and
unattainable," he said. "It’s just a matter of time before we
revise downward . . . and abandon these ridiculous
objectives."
Instead, he predicted that if the Bush administration wins
reelection, it simply will settle for a stable Iraq, probably
run by former Iraqi generals. This is more or less, he said,
what the Marines Corps did in Fallujah — which he described
as a glimpse of future U.S. policy.
Wolfowitz sharply rejected that conclusion about Fallujah.
"Let’s be clear, Fallujah has always been an outlier since
the liberation of Baghdad," he said in the interview. "It’s
where the trouble began. . . . It really isn’t a model for
anything for the rest of the country."
But a senior military intelligence officer experienced in
Middle Eastern affairs said he thinks the administration
needs to rethink its approach to Iraq and to the region. "The
idea that Iraq can be miraculously and quickly turned into a
shining example of democracy that will ’transform’ the Middle
East requires way too much fairy dust and cultural arrogance
to believe," he said.
Finally, some are calling for the United States to stop
fighting separatist trends among Iraq’s three major groups,
the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds, and instead embrace
them. "The best hope for holding Iraq together — and thereby
avoiding civil war — is to let each of its major constituent
communities have, to the extent possible, the system each
wants," Galbraith wrote last month.
Even if adjustments in troop presence and goals help the
United States prevail, it will not happen soon, several of
those interviewed said. The United States is likely to be
fighting in Iraq for at least another five years, said an
Army officer who served there. "We’ll be taking casualties,"
he warned, during that entire time.
A long-term problem for any administration is that it may be
difficult for the American public to tell whether the United
States is winning or losing, and the prospect of continued
casualties may prompt some to ask of how long the public will
tolerate the fighting.
"Iraq might have been worth doing at some price," Vickers
said. "But it isn’t worth doing at any price. And the price
has gone very high."
The other key factor in the war is Iraqi public opinion. A
recent USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll found that a majority of
Iraqis want the United States to leave immediately. "In Iraq,
we are rapidly losing the support of the middle, which will
enable the insurgency to persist practically indefinitely
until our national resolve is worn down," the senior U.S.
military intelligence officer said.
Tolerance of the situation in Iraq also appears to be
declining within the U.S. military. Especially among career
Army officers, an extraordinary anger is building at Rumsfeld
and his top advisers.
"Like a lot of senior Army guys, I’m quite angry" with
Rumsfeld and the rest of the Bush administration, the young
general said. He listed two reasons. "One is, I think they
are going to break the Army." But what really incites him, he
said, is, "I don’t think they care."
Jeff Smith, a former general counsel of the CIA (news - web
sites) who has close ties to many senior officers, said,
"Some of my friends in the military are exceedingly angry."
In the Army, he said, "It’s pretty bitter."
Retired Army Col. Robert Killebrew, a frequent Pentagon
consultant, said, "The people in the military are mad as
hell." He said the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air
Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, should be fired. A spokesman for
Myers declined to comment.
A Special Forces officer aimed higher, saying that "Rumsfeld
needs to go, as does Wolfowitz."
Asked about such antagonism, Wolfowitz said, "I wish they’d
have the — whatever it takes — to come tell me to my face."
He said that by contrast, he had been "struck at how many
fairly senior officers have come to me" to tell him that he
and Rumsfeld have made the right decisions concerning the
Army.