Gen. Zinni: ’They’ve Screwed Up’

By Steve Croft

by 60 Minutes / CBS News

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/05/21/60minutes/main618896.shtml

Retired General Anthony Zinni is one of the most respected
and outspoken military leaders of the past two decades.

>From 1997 to 2000, he was commander-in-chief of the United
States Central Command, in charge of all American troops in
the Middle East. That was the same job held by Gen. Norman
Schwarzkopf before him, and Gen. Tommy Franks after.

Following his retirement from the Marine Corps, the Bush
administration thought so highly of Zinni that it appointed
him to one of its highest diplomatic posts — special envoy
to the Middle East.

But Zinni broke ranks with the administration over the war in
Iraq, and now, in his harshest criticism yet, he says senior
officials at the Pentagon are guilty of dereliction of duty
— and that the time has come for heads to roll.
Correspondent Steve Kroft reports.

’There has been poor strategic thinking in this,’ says Zinni.
’There has been poor operational planning and execution on
the ground. And to think that we are going to ‘stay the
course,’ the course is headed over Niagara Falls. I think
it’s time to change course a little bit, or at least hold
somebody responsible for putting you on this course. Because
it’s been a failure.’ Zinni spent more than 40 years serving
his country as a warrior and diplomat, rising from a young
lieutenant in Vietnam to four-star general with a reputation
for candor.

Now, in a new book about his career, co-written with Tom
Clancy, called "Battle Ready," Zinni has handed up a scathing
indictment of the Pentagon and its conduct of the war in
Iraq.

In the book, Zinni writes: "In the lead up to the Iraq war
and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum, true dereliction,
negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying,
incompetence and corruption."

’I think there was dereliction in insufficient forces being
put on the ground and fully understanding the military
dimensions of the plan. I think there was dereliction in lack
of planning,’ says Zinni. ’The president is owed the finest
strategic thinking. He is owed the finest operational
planning. He is owed the finest tactical execution on the
ground. - He got the latter. He didn’t get the first two.’

Zinni says Iraq was the wrong war at the wrong time - with
the wrong strategy. And he was saying it before the U.S.
invasion. In the months leading up to the war, while still
Middle East envoy, Zinni carried the message to Congress:
’This is, in my view, the worst time to take this on. And I
don’t feel it needs to be done now.’

But he wasn’t the only former military leader with doubts
about the invasion of Iraq. Former General and National
Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, former Centcom Commander
Norman Schwarzkopf, former NATO Commander Wesley Clark, and
former Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki all voiced their
reservations.

Zinni believes this was a war the generals didn’t want - but
it was a war the civilians wanted.

’I can’t speak for all generals, certainly. But I know we
felt that this situation was contained. Saddam was
effectively contained. The no-fly, no-drive zones. The
sanctions that were imposed on him,’ says Zinni.

’Now, at the same time, we had this war on terrorism. We were
fighting al Qaeda. We were engaged in Afghanistan. We were
looking at ’cells’ in 60 countries. We were looking at
threats that we were receiving information on and
intelligence on. And I think most of the generals felt, let’s
deal with this one at a time. Let’s deal with this threat
from terrorism, from al Qaeda.’

One of Zinni’s responsibilities while commander-in-chief at
Centcom was to develop a plan for the invasion of Iraq. Like
his predecessors, he subscribed to the belief that you only
enter battle with overwhelming force.

But Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld thought the job
could be done with fewer troops and high-tech weapons.

How many troops did Zinni’s plan call for? ’We were much in
line with Gen. Shinseki’s view,’ says Zinni. ’We were talking
about, you know, 300,000, in that neighborhood.’

What difference would it have made if 300,000 troops had been
sent in, instead of 180,000?

’I think it’s critical in the aftermath, if you’re gonna go
to resolve a conflict through the use of force, and then to
rebuild the country,’ says Zinni.

’The first requirement is to freeze the situation, is to gain
control of the security. To patrol the streets. To prevent
the looting. To prevent the ’revenge’ killings that might
occur. To prevent bands or gangs or militias that might not
have your best interests at heart from growing or
developing.’

Last month, Secretary Rumsfeld
acknowledged that he hadn’t anticipated the level of violence
that would continue in Iraq a year after the war began.
Should he have been surprised? ’He should not have been
surprised. You know, there were a number of people, before we
even engaged in this conflict, that felt strongly we were
underestimating the problems and the scope of the problems we
would have in there,’ says Zinni. ’Not just generals, but
others — diplomats, those in the international community
that understood the situation. Friends of ours in the region
that were cautioning us to be careful out there. I think he
should have known that.’

Instead, Zinni says the Pentagon relied on inflated
intelligence information about weapons of mass destruction
from Iraqi exiles, like Ahmed Chalabi and others, whose
credibility was in doubt. Zinni claims there was no viable
plan or strategy in place for governing post-Saddam Iraq.

’As best I could see, I saw a pickup team, very small,
insufficient in the Pentagon with no detailed plans that
walked onto the battlefield after the major fighting stopped
and tried to work it out in the huddle — in effect to create
a seat-of-the-pants operation on reconstructing a country,’
says Zinni.

’I give all the credit in the world to Ambassador Bremer as a
great American who’s serving his country, I think, with all
the kind of sacrifice and spirit you could expect. But he has
made mistake after mistake after mistake.’

What mistakes? ’Disbanding the army,’ says Zinni. ’De-
Baathifying, down to a level where we removed people that
were competent and didn’t have blood on their hands that you
needed in the aftermath of reconstruction = alienating
certain elements of that society.’

Zinni says he blames the Pentagon for what happened. ’I blame
the civilian leadership of the Pentagon directly. Because if
they were given the responsibility, and if this was their
war, and by everything that I understand, they promoted it
and pushed it - certain elements in there certainly - even to
the point of creating their own intelligence to match their
needs, then they should bear the responsibility,’ he says.

’But regardless of whose responsibility I think it is,
somebody has screwed up. And at this level and at this stage,
it should be evident to everybody that they’ve screwed up.
And whose heads are rolling on this? That’s what bothers me
most.’

Adds Zinni: ’If you charge me with the responsibility of
taking this nation to war, if you charge me with implementing
that policy with creating the strategy which convinces me to
go to war, and I fail you, then I ought to go.’

Who specifically is he talking about?

’Well, it starts with at the top. If you’re the secretary of
defense and you’re responsible for that. If you’re
responsible for that planning and that execution on the
ground. If you’ve assumed responsibility for the other
elements, non-military, non-security, political, economic,
social and everything else, then you bear responsibility,’
says Zinni. ’Certainly those in your ranks that foisted this
strategy on us that is flawed. Certainly they ought to be
gone and replaced.’

Zinni is talking about a group of policymakers within the
administration known as "the neo-conservatives" who saw the
invasion of Iraq as a way to stabilize American interests in
the region and strengthen the position of Israel. They
include Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz;
Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith; Former Defense
Policy Board member Richard Perle; National Security Council
member Eliot Abrams; and Vice President Cheney’s chief of
staff, Lewis "Scooter" Libby.

Zinni believes they are political ideologues who have
hijacked American policy in Iraq.

’I think it’s the worst kept secret in Washington. That
everybody - everybody I talk to in Washington has known and
fully knows what their agenda was and what they were trying
to do,’ says Zinni.

’And one article, because I mentioned the neo-conservatives
who describe themselves as neo-conservatives, I was called
anti-Semitic. I mean, you know, unbelievable that that’s the
kind of personal attacks that are run when you criticize a
strategy and those who propose it. I certainly didn’t
criticize who they were. I certainly don’t know what their
ethnic religious backgrounds are. And I’m not interested.’

Adds Zinni: ’I know what strategy they promoted. And openly.
And for a number of years. And what they have convinced the
president and the secretary to do. And I don’t believe there
is any serious political leader, military leader, diplomat in
Washington that doesn’t know where it came from.’

Zinni said he believed their strategy was to change the
Middle East and bring it into the 21st century.

’All sounds very good, all very noble. The trouble is the way
they saw to go about this is unilateral aggressive
intervention by the United States - the take down of Iraq as
a priority,’ adds Zinni. ’And what we have become now in the
United States, how we’re viewed in this region is not an
entity that’s promising positive change. We are now being
viewed as the modern crusaders, as the modern colonial power
in this part of the world.’

Should all of those involved, including Rumsfeld and
Wolfowitz, resign? ’I believe that they should accept
responsibility for that,’ says Zinni. ’If I were the
commander of a military organization that delivered this kind
of performance to the president, I certainly would tender my
resignation. I certainly would expect to be gone.’

’You say we need to change course — that the current course
is taking us over Niagara Falls. What course do you think
ought to be set,’ Kroft asked Zinni.

’Well, it’s been evident from the beginning what the course
is. We should have gotten this U.N. resolution from the
beginning. What does it take to sit down with the members of
the Security Council, the permanent members, and find out
what it takes,’ says Zinni.

’What is it they want to get this resolution? Do they want a
say in political reconstruction? Do they want a piece of the
pie economically? If that’s the cost, fine. What they’re
gonna pay for up front is boots on the ground and involvement
in sharing the burden.’

Are there enough troops in Iraq now?

’Do I think there are other missions that should be taken on
which would cause the number of troops to go up, not just
U.S., but international participants? Yes,’ says Zinni.

’We should be sealing off the borders, we should be
protecting the road networks. We’re not only asking for
combat troops, we’re looking for trainers; we’re looking for
engineers. We are looking for those who can provide services
in there.’

But has the time come to develop an exit strategy?

’There is a limit. I think it’s important to understand what
the limit is. Now do I think we are there yet? No, it is
salvageable if you can convince the Iraqis that what we’re
trying to do is in their benefit in the long run,’ says
Zinni.

’Unless we change our communication and demonstrate a
different image to the people on the street, then we’re gonna
get to the point where we are going to be looking for quick
exits. I don’t believe we’re there now. And I wouldn’t want
to see us fail here.’

Zinni, who now teaches international relations at the College
of William and Mary, says he feels a responsibility to speak
out, just as former Marine Corps Commandant David Shoup
voiced early concerns about the Vietnam war nearly 40 years
ago. ’It is part of your duty. Look, there is one statement
that bothers me more than anything else. And that’s the idea
that when the troops are in combat, everybody has to shut up.
Imagine if we put troops in combat with a faulty rifle, and
that rifle was malfunctioning, and troops were dying as a
result,’ says Zinni.

’I can’t think anyone would allow that to happen, that would
not speak up. Well, what’s the difference between a faulty
plan and strategy that’s getting just as many troops killed?
It’s leading down a path where we’re not succeeding and
accomplishing the missions we’ve set out to do.’

60 Minutes asked Secretary Rumsfeld and his deputy Wolfowitz
to respond to Zinni’s remarks. The request for an interview
was declined.

(c)MMIV, CBS Broadcasting Inc.