How Bush Prefers Chemical Companies to National Security

The Progressive

How Bush Prefers Chemical Companies to National Security

Open to Attack
Bush gives in to chemical companies,
leaving the nation vulnerable.

by Anne-Marie Cusac
<http://www.progressive.org/nov03/cu...>
The Progressive
November 2003 Issue

Since September 11, 2001, the nation has been on alert
about the vulnerability of chemical facilities. And
while the Bush Administration claims that homeland
security is a priority, time after time, it has opted to
do nothing dramatic to improve the security of U.S.
chemical facilities. All along, it has followed the
wishes of the U.S. chemical industry—at our peril.

The risk to the American people is great. According to
the General Accounting Office, "123 chemical facilities
located throughout the nation have toxic ’worst-case’
scenarios where more than a million people in the
surrounding area could be at risk of exposure to a cloud
of toxic gas if a release occurred."

Approximately 700 other plants, says the GAO, "could
each potentially threaten at least 100,000 people in the
surrounding area, and about 3,000 facilities could each
potentially threaten at least 10,000 people."

The Bush Administration knows there is a huge security
risk. On February 6, 2002, George Tenet, the director of
the Central Intelligence Agency, testified that Al Qaeda
could be planning to target chemical facilities. In
February 2003, the Bush Administration announced that
terrorists "may attempt to launch conventional attacks
against the U.S. nuclear/chemical industrial
infrastructure to cause contamination, disruption, and
terror. Based on information, nuclear power plants and
industrial chemical plants remain viable targets." (This
article looks at security in the chemical industry.)

The Administration refuses to do what is necessary to
protect the American public from terrorist attacks on
chemical plants. Instead, it is listening to what
industry wants.

"We haven’t even done the minimal things," says Gary
Hart, the former Democratic Senator from Colorado and
one-time Presidential candidate. "There has been zero
leadership from either the White House or the new
department" of Homeland Security.

Hart has a lot of credibility on this issue. As co-chair
of the United States Commission on National Security in
the Twenty-First Century, he helped author the
commission’s prescient report, "New World Coming:
American Security in the 21st Century," published in
September 1999. The report warned that, in the course of
the next quarter century, terrorist acts involving
weapons of mass destruction were likely to increase.
"Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in
large numbers," it said.

Hart says that private industry won’t spend what it
takes to make adequate security changes. "I don’t think
many companies are going to disturb their bottom line,"
he says, "unless they are ordered to by the federal
government, or if the President goes on national TV and
tells them to do so." Those orders have not yet arrived.

Bush has given primary responsibility for overseeing
security improvements in the chemical industry to the
EPA. At first, the EPA appeared eager to take on the
task. In fact, then-EPA Administrator Christine Todd
Whitman even prepared a speech announcing a new security
initiative, according to papers Greenpeace obtained
through an EPA leak and a Freedom of Information Act
request.

A June 11, 2002, document labeled, "Draft—Pre-
decisional—Do Not Cite or Quote," concerns a "Rollout
Strategy for Chemical Facility Site Security." According
to the documents, Whitman and Tom Ridge, head of
Homeland Security, were to announce the new policy at
the White House.

"I am pleased to join Governor Ridge today to announce a
series of new initiatives by the Environmental
Protection Agency to advance security at facilities that
handle hazardous chemicals," Whitman’s speech begins.
"Particularly in the post-9/11 era, it should be clear
to everyone that facilities handling the most dangerous
chemicals must take reasonable precautions to protect
themselves and their communities from the potential
consequences of a criminal attack."

EPA was going to get right on it. "Starting in July, EPA
representatives will begin visiting high priority
chemical facilities to discuss their current and planned
security efforts," the speech read. "These visits will
allow EPA to survey security and, if appropriate,
encourage security improvements at these facilities."

Despite the detailed preparations, Whitman never gave
the speech, and the new policy was never issued.

What happened?

Industry weighed in.

"We heard from industry," says a former EPA official who
declines to be named. The chemical lobby insisted that
the agency did not have authority to go after companies
that did not adequately safeguard their plants, the
official says.

Also hearing from industry was Bush’s Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ), which has a sympathetic
ear. The CEQ is located across the street from the White
House and is headed by James Connaughton, who formerly
worked as a lobbyist for power companies.

Industry lobbying groups such as the American Chemistry
Council and the American Petroleum Institute were in
repeated contact with the CEQ during the summer and fall
of 2002, according to the documents Greenpeace obtained.

The American Petroleum Institute vehemently opposed EPA
regulation of plant security under the Clean Air Act.
"EPA’s existing authority to regulate ’accidental
releases’ from chemical facilities . . . does not
encompass authority to address terrorist attacks," reads
one document (bold in original) that the petroleum lobby
submitted to the CEQ. The EPA’s claim that it has the
"authority to require plant operators to implement
counter-terrorism measures goes far beyond the plain
language of the statute and would impose new legal
obligations without the proper legislative authority."

Aware of this argument, the EPA considered introducing
legislation that would have explicitly expanded its
authority under the Clean Air Act. Section 112(r)
assigns chemical plants in this country the general duty
of preventing dangerous accidents. The draft legislation
would have broadened this responsibility to require the
chemical industry to take measures to reduce the
potential danger of criminal attacks, including
terrorism.

A draft of the new general duty clause said, "All
chemical facilities handling extremely hazardous
chemicals have a general duty to identify hazards that
may result from releases caused by terrorist or other
criminal activity using appropriate assessment
techniques, to design and maintain a secure facility,
and to minimize the consequences of releases that do
occur." EPA Deputy Administrator Linda Fisher discussed
this draft in a May 2002 presentation entitled "Proposal
for Chemical Security Legislation," according to the
documents.

Fisher’s presentation included a slideshow that revealed
how dire the situation is. One slide, which explained
why the legislation was necessary, asked, "Is industry
safe? No way to answer under current law."

But the EPA backed off on the legislative route as well.

While the chemical and petroleum industries were busy
putting the skids on the EPA, they also were working on
Congress.

Senator Jon Corzine, Democrat of New Jersey, had
attempted to attach an amendment to the Senate’s
Homeland Security bill that would have granted the EPA
authority to regulate security at plants housing
dangerous chemicals. It also would have required those
facilities, when possible, to decrease the amounts of
dangerous substances they store on site.

A modified version of Corzine’s bill, the Chemical
Security Act of 2001, had received unanimous approval
from the Senate’s Environment and Public Works Committee
on July 25, 2002.

An alarmed chemical industry sprang into action,
"mounting daily assaults on the Republican members of
the [Environment and Public Works] committee throughout
August," reported John Judis in The New Republic last
January. An August 29, 2002, letter, signed by thirty
members of the chemical and oil industry lobby and sent
to Republican members of the committee, deplored the new
bill, particularly its proposal to "grant sweeping new
authority to EPA to oversee facility security." The
lobbyists objected strongly to a particular provision
that would have required plants to use "inherently safer
technologies." This would "allow government
micromanagement in mandating substitutions of all
processes and substances," the letter stated, adding
that it could "result in increased security risks."

By September 10, seven out of the nine Republican
members on the committee bowed to the pressure, issuing
a letter against the Corzine bill, claiming it "severely
misses the mark" (emphasis in the original).

During that same summer, members of the American
Chemistry Council (ACC) "gave more than $1 million in
political contributions, most of it to Republicans.
Eight Senators who were critical of the Corzine bill
have received more than $850,000 from the ACC and its
member companies," according to a Common Cause report
dated January 27, 2003.

Frederick Webber, then head of the American Chemistry
Council, was a prominent donor to President Bush’s 2000
campaign, having agreed to raise $100,000 in funding for
it and recruiting "more than twenty-five chemical
industry executives to be Bush fundraisers," said Common
Cause.

In addition to the industry efforts to lobby the
Senators, the American Petroleum Institute was again in
close contact with the CEQ, repeatedly sending copies of
its "talking points" on the Corzine amendment to CEQ
staff.

A September 6, 2002, fax from Red Cavaney, president and
CEO of the American Petroleum Institute, to James
Connaughton, chairman of the CEQ, includes a handwritten
message, "Urgent—Please deliver. Hard copy to follow."
The letter, which begins "Dear Jim," says that if the
EPA gains authority to oversee the anti-terrorism
measures of industry, "a year’s worth of close
cooperation and partnership between industry and a wide
variety of qualified federal security experts may well
be marginalized."

When Corzine attempted to introduce his legislation as
an amendment to the Homeland Security bill, the
Republican Senators blocked a vote, effectively killing
the bill. On November 19, the Homeland Security bill
passed the Senate. The bill did not include Corzine’s
amendment.

Nor did the bill include any other binding provisions
for security at chemical plants.

The industry is proud of the role it played in nixing
the plans for heightened security. .

"The reason we’re organized is to tell the government
what would work well to take care of certain problems,"
says Bill Hickman, spokesman for the American Petroleum
Institute, in response to questions about whether the
organization pressured the government on security
issues. "We always are talking to the government. We
always are telling them what will work best. We’re
familiar with these issues and think we’re pretty good
advisers to the government."

When I approached the American Chemistry Council for
comment, Kate McGloon, a spokeswoman for the
organization, asked, "Is there anyone you need to talk
to?" She instantly offers to put me in touch with people
inside the Department of Homeland Security and the EPA.

Marty Durbin, director of federal relations and team
leader for security at the American Chemistry Council,
says his organization had some problems with Corzine’s
bill because it would have given primary jurisdiction
over chemical plant security "to EPA rather than to the
Department of Homeland Security." EPA officials, he
says, "are not the right folks to be doing security."

Although Corzine reintroduced his bill this year, a bill
by Senator James Inhofe, Republican of Oklahoma, is also
under consideration. The Inhofe bill, which the American
Chemistry Council says is more to its liking, would
remove chemical plant security oversight from the EPA
and place it in the hands of the Department of Homeland
Security. Gary Hart has criticized the Inhofe bill for
including "virtually no oversight or enforcement of
safety requirements."

Corzine is incredulous at the lack of government
oversight and the risk that entails. "Our chemical
facilities represent a clear vulnerability in our war
against terrorism," he says. "Yet, as common-sense
security measures continue to stall in Congress, this
appears to be a classic instance of the special
interests trumping the public interest. More than two
years after the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon, we have not taken the first step in
setting national security standards for our chemical
infrastructure." Corzine is blunt about who is at fault:
"The Administration is putting the interests of industry
ahead of the safety of the American people."

Chemical companies depend on the rails to transport
hazardous chemicals, and the Department of
Transportation has also buckled under industry pressure.

If chemical security is the weak link in homeland
security, says Rick Hind, legislative director for the
Greenpeace Toxics Campaign, "railroad shipping is the
weak link within that. In order to make a dangerous
chemical plant dangerous, you have to ship dangerous
chemicals. And that goes right through the backyard of
America."

Like the EPA, the Department of Transportation initially
moved to tighten things up. On May 2, 2002, it issued
notice that it was preparing a new rule governing
security requirements for those who sell or transport
hazardous materials. One requirement said, "Routes
should minimize product exposures to populated areas and
avoid tunnels and bridges, where possible."

The DOT’s announcement resulted in almost 300 responses,
nearly all of them from affected industries,
particularly chemical, petroleum, and fertilizer
companies, including the Chlorine Institute, Formosa
Plastics, Monsanto, Phillips Petroleum, Dupont, Dow
Chemical, BASF, the American Petroleum Institute, the
American Chemistry Council, the Dangerous Goods Advisory
Council, the Fertilizer Institute, and the Institute of
Makers of Explosives.

"About ten to twenty" of the comments on the rulemaking
asked that the language about routes "be removed because
it would have locked them in or restricted what they
could do in setting up their individual security plans,"
says Joe Delcambre, a public affairs representative in
the Research and Special Programs Administration at the
Department of Transportation. "To give the industry more
latitude in how they were going to set up their security
plans," he says, "we backed off on the wording."

The department’s final rule, issued in March of this
year, completely omits the language about preferable
routes.

"There’s nothing really in there that says anything
about restricting transport at any time," says Hind. He
expected the rule at least to require constraints on
dangerous chemicals in heavily populated areas during
orange alerts. "But they didn’t even do that," he says.

In September, the Sierra Club photographed a rail tank
car carrying chlorine near the U.S. Capitol. Greenpeace
took notice. "We are formally requesting immediate
action by the Secret Service to address a near and
present danger to the President, Vice President, Speaker
of the House, and all other national leaders living and
working in Washington, D.C.," Hind wrote to the Secret
Service. By the EPA’s own worst-case estimates, a leak
from one ninety-ton rail car of chlorine could kill or
injure "people in the Congress, the White House, and any
of 2.4 million local residents within fourteen miles,"
Hind wrote.

Greenpeace isn’t the only one raising alarms. On June
20, FBI Special Agent Troy Morgan, a specialist on
weapons of mass destruction, addressed a chemical
security summit in Philadelphia. "You’ve heard about
sarin and other chemical weapons in the news," he said,
according to the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. "But it’s
far easier to attack a rail car full of toxic industrial
chemicals than it is to compromise the security of a
military base and obtain these materials."

Jerry Poje is a member of the U.S. Chemical Safety and
Hazard Investigation Board. This government organization
was formed in the wake of the December 2, 1984, Union
Carbide disaster that killed thousands of people in
Bhopal, India. He, too, is worried about chlorine. "It’s
a chemical whose use is very common in the country,"
says Poje. "There are many, many, many rail cars" filled
with it.

Industry says it can adequately monitor itself. The
American Chemistry Council, for one, has adopted a
"Security Code of Management Practices." Member
companies are supposed to conduct vulnerability
assessments using methodologies designed by approved
organizations, implement a security plan, and submit
their security measures to outside verification.

However, the organization is not specific in its
security requirements. For instance, it doesn’t require
background checks on guards. It doesn’t require
companies to minimize the dangerous chemicals they store
on site. It doesn’t require companies to fix holes in
their fences. "You can’t really have a cookie-cutter
approach" to different plants, says Durbin. He also says
that each chemical facility gets to choose the person
who verifies that it has actually carried out a security
plan.

The GAO studied industry’s voluntary efforts. Its March
2003 report is entitled "Voluntary Initiatives Are Under
Way at Chemical Facilities but the Extent of Security
Preparedness Is Unknown." The title pretty much sums up
the problem with security in the chemical industry. We
don’t know what’s going on.

"To date, no one has comprehensively assessed the
security of chemical facilities. No federal laws
explicitly require that chemical facilities assess
vulnerabilities or take security actions to safeguard
their facilities against terrorist attack," says the
report. "No agency monitors or documents the extent to
which chemical facilities have implemented security
measures. Consequently, federal, state, and local
entities lack comprehensive information on the
vulnerabilities facing the industry."

The GAO report reveals that the EPA is worried about the
voluntary initiatives, which "raise an issue of
accountability, since the extent that industry group
members are implementing voluntary initiatives is
unknown."

In the end, voluntary security initiatives collide with
the need to save money. "According to industry
officials, chemical companies face a challenge in
achieving cost-effective security solutions, noting that
companies must weigh the cost of implementing
countermeasures against the perceived reduction in
risk," the GAO report says.

The GAO’s observation that money is getting in the way
of security at our chemical plants is borne out by a
research report by the Conference Board, a business
organization. Entitled "Corporate Security Management:
Organization and Spending Since 9/11," the research
found that "the median increase [from October 2002 to
February 2003] in total security spending is only 4
percent."

The reason for the overall lack of spending on security,
concluded the Conference Board, was economics. "The
perceived need to upgrade corporate security has clashed
with the perceived need to control expenses until the
economy recovers," it reported.

The American Chemistry Council says it does not yet have
figures on what its member companies are spending on
security.

Gary Hart has not stopped issuing warnings. In 2002, he
co-chaired another report, this one sponsored by the
Council on Foreign Relations. Entitled "America Still
Unprepared—America Still in Danger," the report
cautioned, "A year after September 11, 2001, America
remains dangerously unprepared to prevent and respond to
a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil. In all
likelihood, the next attack will result in even greater
casualties and widespread disruption to American lives
and the economy."

On August 11, Hart published an op-ed in The Washington
Post. "The government has failed to plug a gaping hole
in homeland security: our vulnerable chemical plants,"
he wrote. Those plants "are among the potentially most
dangerous components of our critical infrastructure.
Securing them requires urgent action."

Hart blames the Administration’s inaction on "coziness
with the private sector, their campaign contributions,
their political alliances." This Administration, he
tells The Progressive, has a tendency to "put those
political alliances ahead of national security."

Saying he is "very frustrated" at the Bush
Administration’s negligence, Hart warns: "We will be
attacked again."
Anne-Marie Cusac is Investigative Reporter for The
Progressive.