Home > Iraq Quaqmire: What if this is as good as it gets?

Iraq Quaqmire: What if this is as good as it gets?

by Open-Publishing - Wednesday 18 May 2005
1 comment

Wars and conflicts International USA

"We feel right now that we have, as I mentioned, broken the back of the insurgency."

 Marine Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, Nov. 18, after offensive against Fallujah

CHICAGO - Could it be that we’ve misclassified the insurgency in Iraq - that it’s an invertebrate, able to absorb bone-crushing blows because it has no bones to crush? It seems to be more like a dandelion, which, when smashed, only spreads more seeds.

Seven months after U.S. forces leveled the enemy stronghold, the insurgents are causing as much trouble as ever. The lull in violence that followed the January elections was taken to mean the rebels were in disarray. If so, they’ve regrouped, and Iraq has reverted to chaos. Nearly twice as many Iraqi security personnel died in attacks in March as in January. April was almost as bad. May looks worse still.
"
The last couple of weeks have been among the bloodiest since the U.S. invasion, with more than 420 people killed. The insurgents have been mounting an average of 70 attacks a day, compared with 30 or 40 in March.

Fallujah was supposed to make a difference, and so is the recent U.S. offensive in western Iraq. But someone forgot to tell the insurgents. American commanders were surprised at the strength and sophistication of the resistance in this latest campaign.

But this war has been full of surprises, none of them pleasant. In April, even before the latest expansion of violence, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency testified, "The insurgency has grown in size and complexity over the last year." Grown in size? We are spawning terrorists faster than we can kill them.

This offensive may illustrate why. On Thursday, the Associated Press reported that residents of Qaim were angry at American forces for hitting the town with air strikes and artillery. "They destroyed our city, killed our children, destroyed our houses," one man said.

The election was supposed to have the opposite result. It was billed as giving the Iraqi people the chance to defy threats of bloodshed, express their belief in democracy, create a government enjoying broad-based legitimacy and drain support from the insurgency. Instead, the election led to months of squabbling among different factions, creating uncertainty and disenchantment among ordinary Iraqis.

The dilemmas faced by the United States persist. We see no choice but to carry out military missions to kill insurgents - but those missions produce collateral damage that alienates the people we are trying to help. We can’t improve the security environment until we rebuild the infrastructure and revive its economy - which we can’t do until security improves.

The military is showing the effects of the stresses placed on it, with recruiters consistently unable to meet their quotas and some of them breaking the rules to find warm bodies. The Army has missed its recruiting goals for the last three months, including a gaping 42 percent shortfall in April.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard B. Myers warns that insurgencies commonly "last from three, four years to nine years." But successful counterinsurgency wars are rare. We may not have the means to win this one.

Many Americans assume that if we stay the course, things will get better. But it’s worth pondering the question Jack Nicholson asked in As Good as It Gets: "What if this is as good as it gets?"

Steve Chapman is a columnist for the Chicago Tribune, a Tribune Publishing newspaper. His column appears Mondays and Wednesdays in The Sun.

http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/na...

Forum posts

  • <>

    Killing insurgents is vital. To claim that we are in a "dilemma" with no other choices than exercises in futility like OPERATION MATADOR, though, is to display profound ingorance ot counterinsurgency. In David Galula’s 1964 classic "Counerinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice," (now reissued and available from amazon.com) he describes a winning program which our military commanders are too wedded to conventional tactics to use.