When Warriors Become Occupiers

Rapidity is the essence of war.
Sun Tzu Wu

The stinging pain of 9/11 permitted the convergence of two lethal impulses: 1. the 1997 neoconservative strategy for changing the world, elaborated on in the "Project for the New American Century," and 2. a nationwide appetite for a timely response. Accordingly, 9/11 was used as the clarion call to not only attain "justice" but to reconfigure much of the Islamic arena to make the world safer for democracies, and in the process, ideally spawn a few along the way. But as Samuel Huntington pointed out, the Clash of Civilizations was a formidable obstacle. Though it sold well, however, his essay and book had virtually no effect outside of intellectual circles, and didn’t dampen America’s taste for vendetta. A taste that’s understandable even by many pacifists.

The strategy for the War on Terror was greatly influenced by a coalition of intellectuals, think tank sophists, big business magnates, media gurus, publishing executives, newspaper editors, evangelical leaders, government officials, and the unwitting commoners who blindly believed in the plan. Bush and the Administration’s neoconservatives, of course, are mainly responsible, but it has been a collective effort. And thus early supports, regrettably, are still hesitant to admit they were wrong.

Since America’s plan didn’t appropriately factor Huntington’s Clash, or the domestic dissent, ranging from Scott Ritter to Noam Chomsky, or the critiques of many foreign governments, it wasn’t broad nor deep enough to successfully accomplish the mission. Many people claim there was no way of knowing in advance whether or not the mission would’ve worked, which is a conclusion based more on wishful thinking than profound understanding.

There are several prominent reasons the war on terror in general and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were destined to fail in accomplishing the goals of replacing the existing regimes with more enlightened ones. And to think otherwise one would have to believe in the delusional ideal that the Islamic world was up for the taking and would’ve been successfully reorganized along imperialist lines.

According to Huntington, the oil boom of the 70s was chiefly responsible for empowering latent Islamic militancy. If nothing else it was the chief cause that set into motion, one might call it, Project for the New Islamic Century, underwritten by the Muslim Brotherhood, Abu el A’ala Muwdudi, Sayyid Qutb and the various clerics and malcontents insisting on a victory over the infidels. Though splintered throughout the Muslim world, these rebellious passions became an amalgamated movement, fomented by word-of-mouth allegiance, fatwas, detailed books, and hardened prejudices. The principal target was al-Salibiyya (Western Imperialism).

The methodology for achieving the militants’ aims was clearly spelled out, but obviously wasn’t given enough attention by the neoconservatives. Indeed, the U.S. military was much better apprised of the circumstances since they were pragmatists figuring out how to do a job instead of ideologues trying to fit a round peg into a square hole. The military’s remarkable prescient admonitions, unfortunately, went largely unheeded.

The militants’ strategy is based primarily on three basic concepts, which are alien to Western thinking and therefore not very well understood. They include, 1. istidhaf (weakness), 2. hijra (migration), and 3. jihad - war on the infidels. The logic prescribes that militants realize and acknowledge a weak position, which calls for retreat (hijra - in honor of Muhammad’s retreat to Medina). From there, strength is gathered to renew the fight with greater vigor and Allah’s assistance.

Despite its ideological aims, and wicked methods used to achieve victory, the militants’ plan has the advantage of reflective evaluation as opposed to America’s knee-jerk let’s-go-kick-some-ass approach. Their strength from acknowledging weakness may prove to be strategically superior in the long run to Administration’s reluctance to admit its mistakes, refusal to readjust its priorities, and insistence it won’t reform a more viable strategy.

Since the armed opposition forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan will not mount an imperial-style army and fight the fight on the battlefield, they have extended the process from war into formal occupation, furthering the Muslims’ hatred for al-Salibiyya. And since their strategies are based more on the inconsistency of guerilla fighting than on pure insurgencies, their jihad has no end in sight. Here we see another strategic advantage they have over America: Conditioned by centuries of delayed gratification, they’re fighting soldiers with comparatively short terms of duty, eager to wrap things up neatly and quickly. Whatever deficits they may be experiencing, time is on their side. After losing a gun battle, the Taliban simply retreat, reconnoiter and recruit - the three R’s of Islamic militancy - until Allah or a ruling cleric provide a sign to again wage jihad.