Home > AN ITALIAN OCTOBER SURPRISE
by Matt Bojanovic
In April 2004, in Fallujah, hundreds were being buried in backyards and soccer fields. In Baghdad, thousands were lining up to give blood and money for Fallujah; there was rage at what was generally viewed as the collective punishment of that city, and even the usually compliant Iraqi authorities were beginning to raise objections. At that point, some Iraqi insurgents had a novel idea: they would grab the attention of public opinion in the West by detaining soft targets from the countries involved in the occupation.
On April 12 came the capture of four Italian "contractors." That’s what soldiers of fortune are called in polite society. They work in distant lands for remarkable wages, sometimes as high as $1000 per day. They are former soldiers, provided opportunities in outfits owned by well-connected retired officers. The major advantage of using "contractors" is that they must provide for their own lodgings, protection, and transportation, and are not counted as Coalition casualties when they die. The four Italians were on their way back to Amman, when they were stopped at an American road block and relieved of the assault rifles they were carrying. The four Italians went back to the hotel and secured two handguns and an automatic pistol, that they hoped to keep hidden at the next road block. They took off again for Amman, and were captured. (Corriere della Sera, April 18, La Repubblica, May2)
The Sunday Telegraph of London, on May 2, interviewed Paolo Simeoni, former leader of the Italian security team to which the Italians belonged. He is quoted as saying: "We do not know exactly why the soldiers confiscated the weapons. The Iraqi interior ministry does not issue weapons permits to Westerners - they say that normally all you need to do is show an ID card, such as a passport. All my men had Italian passports on them, and Fabrizio had a pass for the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Normally that is more than enough proof that they were working in security for the coalition, but in this case the soldiers wouldn’t accept it... If they had been British or American, I think it would have been fine. It may be that because they were Italians and their English was not quite perfect, the soldiers did not trust them." Another security consultant explained: "Four men with powerful assault rifles in a car might have stood a chance against these guys. Four men with just one MP5 and a couple of pistols between them would probably not have."
They were Italy’s first POW’s since WWII. They were not POW’s in uniform, but to Italians that made no difference, their lives were at stake, they had mothers and sisters and wives, and that was enough. They had gone to Iraq for exactly the same reasons why Italian uniformed men are there: trust in their political leaders, esprit de corps, career opportunities, adventure, and combat pay. After all, the origin of the word soldier is the Latin "solidus", which was coinage paid Roman soldiers.
According to Il Manifesto of July 29 and July 30, being on mission abroad can involve a four-fold increase in pay, and it was not uncommon to have to bribe officers to insure being sent to Iraq. Italian soldiers would gladly shell out a month’s salary or more, for the honor of being selected for the crusade. A colonel was arrested for taking some $8,000 from a lieutenant. He was accused of taking a total of $50,000 from seven men. On May 5 he was given a two-year suspended sentence, but he had managed to retire, at the grade of general, in advance of sentencing,. For an officer, Iraqi duty means more than combat pay, it also offers rapid promotion. In another case, a soldier gave $2000 to a colonel in exchange for foreign assignement, and had a money order receipt to prove it. Interviewed in Peace Reporter, Antonio Savino of the Carabinieri National Union, confirms that there was a lively market for assignments to Iraq—until it was all but ruined by heavy casualties in Nassiriya, where 20 Italians perished. .http://www.peacereporter.net/it/canali/storie/0000medioriente/iraq/040805tangenti When it became known that soldiers were contracting cancer after serving in areas contaminated by depleted uranium, the Iraqi career market just dried up.
On April 13 the four Italian POW’s were seen on Al Jazeera. For their release, the following demands were made: the establishment of a timetable for the withdrawal of Italian troops from Iraq, the release of all detained Muslim clerics, and an apology for some intemperate remarks made by Premier Berlusconi about Islam.
Italian Foreign Minister Frattini answered that "negotiation with guerrillas is contrary to logic." Other notables of the ruling right wing coalition were equally determined. Cicchitto said that blackmail is "unacceptable since our soldiers are in Iraq on a peace mission." Schifani spoke against "weakness". Bondi said that the kidnapping "shows the inhuman character of terrorism, as denounced by the Holy Father." Anedda said that the "kidnappers are showing all their cruelty and rudeness." Minister of Justice Castelli closed the discussion with the remark that "those who do this kind of work make lots of money but run very high risks." (Adnkronos news agency, April 13) The four were being abandoned by the leaders who had encouraged them to go do their part in the War on Terror.
The patriot section of the Italian press responded by railing against "the civilization of Koran-inspired camel herders." There were warnings that "the patience of good democrats" has limits, and that "in Italy there are 800,000 Muslims, potentially 800,000 hostages." Should the hostages be killed, Moslems might no longer be safe in Italy, wrote Vittorio Feltri, editor of the liberist dailyLibero, on April 14.
On April 16 the insurgents killed, on camera, Fabrizio Quattrocchi. In his pocket he had a pass to the Green Zone, the seat of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. That pass had not been good enough to protect his little war party from being disarmed by the Coalition, but convinced the insurgents that the poor guy was somehow well connected to Proconsul Bremer.
The murder of Quattrocchi was announced on a TV talk show, and that is how his family heard about it. The families of the surviving hostages became an important pressure group. Some of the relatives became celebrities. They exposed the rainbow banner of the Italian peace movement from their balconies and joined peace marches, including one to the Vatican. The father of one of the hostages, who for two months carried a large Italian flag on a staff wherever he went, became a familiar figure on television. One day he led his relatives to blockade the railroad tracks near his home.
THE CONNECTION
The Italian Red Cross (CRI) is a reputable and effective organization, which brought two of its hospitals to Iraq. On April 18, Maurizio Scelli, special commissioner of the CRI, delivers a brand new emergency room to the Iraquis. Contacts are made with the Council of the Ulemas, the Muslim scholars previously involved in the negotiated release of a couple dozen hostages, including the Japanese. On April 19, Scelli leads a CRI humanitarian convoy to the besieged city of Fallujah.
Negotiations are openly discussed in the Italian media and no denials are issuing from Rome. On April 20 the Italian governor of the province of Dhi Qar, which includes Nassiriya, is interviewed in La Repubblica. Governor Barbara Contini is a significant personage. A few days before, she had taken part in a meeting on the hostage situation with Premier Berlusconi, Vice Premier Fini, Foreign Affairs Minister Frattini, Minister of Defense Martino, Minister of Interior Pisanu, and the heads of the secret services. Governor Contini is quoted saying : "Is ransom the way out for the Italians? Everyone pays ransom. It’s been so for centuries."
Indeed, when an insurgency holds foreigners as prisoners, there are four choices for the occupier: negotiated withdrawal, abandonment of the men to their fate, exchange of prisoners, and ransom. The Coalition leaders do not dare to admit defeat and withdraw. A prisoner exchange is problematic, since it would give belligerent status to the insurgents. Moreover, the Americans are in control of prisons and oppose any negotiations. An exchange for guerrillas held by the Kurds is proposed, but falls apart when it transpires that out of nine wanted prisoners, five have already been killed. (Corriere della Sera, June 9, paper edition, p.6)
Still, Premier Berlusconi has to do something: he had taken Italy to war against the will of the great majority of Italians, presenting the adventure as a "peace mission," and now he cannot afford appearing so heartless as to abandon his own men. The original inflexible attitude against negotiations had strengthened the opposition. Ransom is the only choice left open.
Corriere della Sera, on April 21, opens with the line, "It appears that ransom has been paid for the Italian hostages. Or not." Barbara Contini had told L’antipatico, on Channel 5, "Yes, a price has been paid. Now the Italians are out of danger." Later that day, she explains that it was all an "unpleasant misunderstanding". Through her spokesperson, Paola della Casa, she says that "there is always a price to pay, but I was not referring to money. I do not have the foggiest idea about any ransom demand."
On April 22, various sources openly speak of ransom. La Repubblica reports that payment of ransom is being considered. Panorama, a weekly owned by the Berlusconi family, declares that the office of the Premier has approved ransom, to be delivered after the men have been freed. The Italian news agency ANSA has a report in which an unnamed member of the Italian secret services recognizes that negotiations are taking place and that they have "para-political and economic aspects." He adds, "What we had to do, we did."
On April 22, Il Tempo of Rome, a business-oriented daily, thought to be close to the government, prints an article under the signature Fosca Bincher, said to be the alias of the director of Il Tempo, Franco Bechis. Quoting "important banking sources" the article reveals that Premier Silvio Berlusconi had arranged for ransom payment from his own personal fortune, not from state treasury. Former Italian president Francesco Cossiga is also quoted as saying, on Radio Padania: "I would not be surprised if Silvio Berlusconi had paid the ransom from his own pocket. I am not saying that Berlusconi paid, I am only saying that, knowing his generosity, I would not be surprised if he had paid the ransom from his own pocket. He sure is as wealthy as Uncle Scrooge, but unlike the one of the comic books, he is very generous. If Barbara Contini says that the three are out of danger, it means he made out a pretty big check."
Il Tempo thus continues: ’When it seemed to be all done, and the liberation of the hostages was expected yesterday, new obstacles emerged. "The process is not blocked, it’s only delayed," said Berlusconi. He added: "The timeline has lengthened in respect to what we expected. Perhaps because they [the Americans] have delayed the permit for the Italian humanitarian aid column to Fallujah." ’
Abdel Salam Kubaysi, of the Council of the Ulemas, is quoted in La Repubblica of April 22, denying "direct communications" with the hostage takers. However, he can say that if there is not an end to the fighting in Fallujah, the release of "those poor three boys" might be slowed down. Kubaysi added: "The Italian government, obviously, can pressure the White House so that Fallujah may return to life. After all, are you or are you not the best friends of Bush?" On April 19, Premier Berlusconi had proudly announced that with the departure of Spanish troops from Iraq, Italy was now "the closest ally of the United States in continental Europe."
On April 23 Il Tempo reports from the Italian Chamber of Deputies that "the news of the 5 million euro ransom paid from the pocket of the Premier...did not surprise anyone."
La Repubblica of April 25, reported from Baghdad the rumor that a six million euro payment has already arrived, but that the fate of the hostages is tied to the fate of Fallujah. For the American command, it is important to smash the resistance in Fallujah, "but it is equally important not to lose, or risk losing, the Italian allies."
Roland Flamini of UPI thus explained the situation on May 7: "Keeping the hostages alive is considered vital for the continued deployment of Italian troops serving with the U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. The killing of a second man could create such a public backlash that it could force the Berlusconi government to pull out Italy’s contingent."
THE PEACE PARTY’S EFFORTS
Emergency is an Italian NGO, organized in the early 90’s by a surgeon, Dr Gino Strada, to establish hospitals in war zones. To give an idea of its reputation, Vauro tells this story on Il Manifesto of June 19: ’During the last war in Afghanistan I was...in a front line trench of the Northern Alliance, on the Bahgrahm front. A Mujaheddin commander called by radio his counterpart in the Taliban trenches, a few hundred yards away. "I have some foreign reporters here," he said. The Taliban commander, with a menacing laugh, said: "Send them here, I’ll take care of them." He then added, "Where are they from?" "Italians." And the Taliban said, "Italia? Gino Strada, Emergency! For us they would be [honored] guests," and he said it without laughing, with respect.’
Emergency has had hospitals in Iraq for years, and it has an office in Baghdad. Emergency produces a video showing how the great majority of Italians oppose the war, how a million demonstrated against it. The video appears on Arab television networks. Gino Strada arrives in Baghdad on May 5 and soon concludes that there may be a division between the insurgents’ military wing and their political wing: one wants ransom, the other would prefer to influence the Italian elections by releasing the prisoners to Italian peace movement leaders. Strada’s contacts advise him that Salih Mutlak, a businessman who made his wealth in the smuggling trade, thanks to the U.S./UN embargo, has returned from Italy with five million dollars. They say that the balance of the 9 million dollar deal would be payable when the prisoners are released.
The Italian daily La Stampa reports on May 14 that Mohammed Al Kubaysi on April 30 has suggested to Italian Red Cross boss Scelli, that it would be a positive thing if seriously sick and wounded children in Fallujah were to be flown to Italian hospitals. A CRI jet brings dozens of patients to Rome on May 13.
The negotiations are slowed down by the arrest of an intermediary by American forces. The remains of Quattrocchi are delivered to the Italian Red Cross; Scelli brings them to Italy and returns to Baghdad. Cardinal Bertone says that negotiations are on course. The agents of SISMI, Italy’s military intellingence, leave Baghdad, as if their work had come to a successful conclusion. (La Repubblica, June 10)
On June 2, Scelli leads a CRI humanitarian convoy into Najaf, the Shiite holy city that has seen heavy fighting, while anti-war demonstrations are taking place in Rome, against Berlusconi and the Bush visit, as demanded by the kidnappers. Demonstrations had already been planned and announced, when the demand was made. Al Jazeera shows the demonstrations. The hostage takers release a video in which the Italians make an appeal to the Pope.
On Friday, June 4, Foregn Minister Frattini cancels a trip to Japan "for family reasons." Pope John Paul issues a critical appeal against the war to the visiting President Bush, who answers that his own objective is to "spread peace and compassion." http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040604-3.html
On Saturday, June 5, Al Kubaysi of the Council of the Ulemas calls Scelli and tells him that the hostages will soon be freed. (La Repubblica, June 11)
According to Nicola Madaro, Mayor of Sanmichele di Bari, the TV crews return to Sanmichele, waiting to record the joyful reactions of the family of Umberto Cupertino, one of the hostages. (L’Unita’, June 9)
According to Emergency’s website, www.peacereporter.it, between Saturday and Sunday, Gino Strada receives the report from the Imam of Fallujah that the matter is solved and that the prisoners will soon be released.
On Sunday, June 6, in a clear reference to the Abu Ghraib torture situation, the Pope mentions the oppressed, "especially those who suffer the humiliation of prison and the oppression of torture."
According to La Stampa of June 9, Ignazio LaRussa, parliamentary leader of the AN party of Vive Premier Fini, mentions that "friends of AN in the Jewish community in Milan had given me for certain the liberation of the hostages within 48 hours."
ICN-News, an Italian Evangelical news agency, in an article praising the ecumenical spirit of cooperation between churches, publishes on June 9 the text of an interview with Sheikh Ahmad El-Shammari, who says: " On June 6, I was dining with the leader of the Zauba’a clan, who assured me that the case was closed and that the hostages would be released, in a matter of hours. At once I phoned Bishop Shlimon Warduni... and told him to inform the representative of the Vatican in Baghdad."
THE RAID
At 2.23 pm on Tuesday, June 8, the news agency ANSA reports that General Mieczyslaw Bieniek, commander of Polish forces in Iraq, has announced the hostages’ liberation. General Sanchez, at a press conference in the late afternoon of June 8, reveals that the hostages are in good health, that they had been held together, south of Baghdad, that some individuals had been detained, and that the operation, by coalition forces, was not the result of negotiations. http://www.iraqcoalition.org/transcripts/20040608_sanchez_hostages.html
On Sunday, June13, General Kimmitt gives an interview to Corriere della Sera. He says that the four hostages had been held handcuffed in a house in al-Mahmudiyah, that no shots were fired, and that the photo he is releasing was taken immediately after four of the guards had been captured. (Corriere della Sera, June 13)
The two preceding paragraphs represent the entire body of information released by the CPA in Baghdad that week.
Polish hostage Jerzy Kos had been taken from his Baghdad office on June 1, together with a colleague who escaped, two Iraqi women employees who were released, and three Kurdish guards, who were ransomed. (Corriere della Sera, June 10) Kos says he was freed in Ramadi. He is the engineer who represents a Polish engineering firm in Iraq, and we can assume that he is quite familiar with the map of Iraq. From al-Mahmudiyah to Baghdad airport he would be flying north-north-west for 30 kilometers, without crossing any river. From Ramadi to Baghdad airport he would be flying east, for perhaps 88 kilometers, crossing the Euphrates numerous times, since the river is meandering. The pilot, however, to avoid getting fired at over Fallujah, might well choose to lengthen the trip by a couple of kilometers, flying east-south-east for 35 kilometers over the al-Habbaniyah Lake, then flying east for 55 kilometers to Baghdad airport, crossing the Euphrates River at least once, perhaps three times. It’s difficult to imagine how an engineer flying from al-Mahmudiya could become convinced he was flying from Ramadi.
Associated Press, in a story on the return of Kos to Warsaw on June 10, says the raid was in Ramadi. The employer of Kos, after speaking to him on the phone, says Ramadi. (Corriere della Sera, June 10, paper edition, p.5) La Stampa of June 9 says Ramadi. Premier Berlusconi, talking to an Italian TV show, Studio Aperto, at about 11.50pm on June 8, says "110 kilometers from Baghdad." (La Repubblica, June 12) >From the center of Ramadi to the center of Baghdad the distance is about 110 kilometers. The Premier says he spent "an anxious night" before giving the green light to the raid. (La Stampa, June 9) We can fairly assume that he discussed the raid with his collaborators during that anxious night, perhaps in front of satellite photos of the detention site, certainly in front of the map of Iraq. The war has become a very important issue in Italy. Berlusconi had sent his soldiers as peace keepers, but now they are taking casualties, they are involved in battle. We can fairly assume that, one year into the war, the Premier has become quite familiar with the map of Iraq.
The website of Emergency, www.peacereporter.it, reports a rumor: the location of the raid was a house in Abu Ghraib, a suburb of Baghdad. Monday night, neighbors saw cars stopping at a house, empty for months. Tuesday morning, coalition men in civilian clothes arrived and left with four men.
An Italian TV crew goes to Abu Ghraib and fails to find the address. Daniele Mastrogiacomo of La Repubblica goes there, finds the house, with dusty windows and a locked steel gate. He knocks at a neighbor’s door, who says that he only heard, like everyone else, the sounds of two helicopters that landed in the neighborhood at ten in the morning on the day in question. Perhaps something interesting did happen in Abu Ghraib.
When General Sanchez announces the raid on June 8, details are so scarce as to raise eyebrows. After all, a successful POW release operation is just what you need when the news are bad, day after day. It’s good for your own forces, it’s good for reporters, it’s good for the public. Here is the opportunity to pay back a reporter who has tried to keep some optimism in his reports during a dreary, horrendous sequence of torture photo days, car bomb days, kidnap days, and roadside bomb days.
There were excellent reasons to pick a couple of friendly reporters and bring them along on the raid. The general did not choose to do that, nor did he give reporters the opportunity to see the location of the raid. Or to see the four captured jailers and their weapons. Or to speak to the hostages, who may have needed a shower, but were otherwise in excellent conditions.
It’s odd, that on this, the most positive day since the capture of Saddam Hussein, the Coalition does not want a big story. The international press gets enough from General Sanchez for a two line article. Not much to write home about, as if the general wanted the story to die down quickly. As if this had been an unpleasant job, undertaken to save the face of an ally, who is having his damn election on Saturday.
The secrecy after the operation surprised some. The spokesman of the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Warsaw, Boguslaw Maievsky said: "The Americans have made the entire operation secret...We have to conform, and wait for them to tell us what happened". (La Repubblica, June 10) Others seemed pleased about the secrecy. Foreign Minister Frattini said, "Coalition forces have intervened, particulars cannot and must not be revealed." (Corriere della Sera, June 8)
On June 16 a 30-second clips of a video of the raid is released and is seen on Italian television. It looks like an exercise. The soldiers arrive by helicopter, thus losing the element of surprise and giving the enemy the opportunity to kill the hostages. They rush into a big, empty, abandoned one-story building, which looks like a school. The soldiers kick at already open doors, checking for booby traps. Then we have a gap, and the show starts again as we see the prisoners sitting on the floor in some room. We do not see the soldiers’ entry into that room. (Corriere della Sera, June 17)
A problem: the scene does not fit well with the deposition given to the investigative judges of the Procura di Roma. Salvatore Stefio, in his deposition, said, "In the last days, in the apartment in which they [the Americans] came to get us, another hostage arrived, a Pole." Earlier, he had said, "We were alway locked in houses, apartments." (Corriere della Sera, June 10, paper edition, p.3)
General Kimmitt had already released a photo, saying it was the only photo of the raid. (Corriere della Sera, June 13) The photo showed the Polish engineer having his handcuffs cut with a bolt cutter, while Salvatore Stefio, whose handcuffs have already been cut, gives his thumbs-up. The two prisoners are on the floor. http://www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Esteri/2004/06_Giugno/13/pop_ostaggi.shtml
In Salvatore Stefio’s deposition we read: "The door of the room where we were locked up was kicked in, and a voice, evidently of an American, screamed ’Go, go!’ We came out and found these guys who told us we were free." We also read that, "In the jails also, they tied our feet, so that we could not move." When being moved from one location to another,"we were tied hands and feet" (La Repubblica, June 12) "we were hooded or had our eyes bandaged, and our hands were tied. [’mani legate’ ] " (Corriere della Sera (June 10, paper edition, page 3) Here is a man who speaks with precision, giving two ways of blindfolding someone. You would not expect him to say "tied" when he means "handcuffed".
The hostages talked about their hands being tied only during transfers. Later, they complained about the scarcity of food, but they di not complain of being kept in handcuffs for a day or for two months. There was no mention of handcuffs in the released sections of the deposition.
Here is the June 10 AP report from Warsaw: "Jerzy Kos, after stepping off his plane, his face pale and voice trembling, said ’I am so moved, I can hardly speak.’ They were imprisoned in a house in Ramadi, west of Baghdad, until Tuesday, when they heard helicopters approaching. The door was then blown in, kicking up a dust cloud and knocking the hostages to the ground. ’When I opened my eyes, I saw American soldiers. They said, "Don’t worry, we are Americans." They held our hands and we ran to the helicopter - I will remember that for the rest of my life. It was fast and unexpected. They did it perfectly.’ " Kos, a man in his 60’s, also complained about the terrible food, but did not mention the pain of being kept in handcuffs during his captivity.
In the Sky News report from Warsaw Kos says: "With the Italians, we each crouched in our corner, without paying any attention to our armed guards, the room was filled with dust while the whole thing went on." The story ends as follows: "The US-led force in Iraq has so far refused to give further information on the rescue."
Listening to the rescue tales of the prisoners, one does not see men in handcuffs, with their feet tied. It seems that we may be dealing with two or three different rescues, one with an explosion, one without, one with a cloud of dust in the air, one with excellent visibility. One with the prisoners lying on the floor handcuffed, waiting for the bolt cutter to free them, one with the prisoners obeying the "Go, go!" order, coming out of the room on their own, to be told they are free. Perhaps the Italians were picked up in some house in Abu Ghraib, where they were left alone, and not bound. Perhaps the Polish engineer was freed in an actual raid in Ramadi. Perhaps they were all brought together to be actors in a valuable educational film. Perhaps the actors are blending details of their actual liberation into the story of the subsequent staged liberation.
Is it fair to suggest that the hostages might agree to lie a little? It’s fair, because it would be shameful for them not to lie. If you are devoted to a cause and if the chief has paid millions for your life, the least you can do is give him your loyalty, and go along with a tall tale, one that will favor your saviour , your cause, and your future career opportunities. As H.L Mencken said, " It is hard to believe that a man is telling the truth when you know that you would lie if you were in his place."
The hostage liberation story is questionable because of the quasi-official admissions of ransom payment in April and May, the general expectation of impending release on June 6, the secrecy in which the raid was wrapped, and the conflict between witness statement and the released video.
The secrecy might be explained as the bureaucratic tendency to increase the importance of one’s office through secrecy. ReadCatch-22: the fact that a letter is heavily censored is not evidence that there were any secrets in the letter. It only indicates that censors must censor, that this letter was censored, perhaps that the censors have gone mad, or that they are bored to tears and are inventing silly censorious games to spend their days on.
The other inconsistencies need clarification.
THE DENIAL
From the very first day, the ransom issue casts its shadow over the celebrations of a remarkably bloodless hostage liberation.
Commissioner Maurizio Scelli of the Italian Red Cross, interviewed by La Stampa, says "This is not a release, this is a liberation by military action. And we, of the Red Cross, have no merit in it."
Foreign Minister Franco Frattini, says that "no negotiations were conducted with the kidnappers... the military raid was the result of good intelligence work and cooperation between Italian and coalition forces." (The New York Times, June 8) Frattini claims that the hostages have been freed thanks to "a new model of integration between diplomacy, intelligence, humanitarian aid, and armed forces." (La Repubblica, June 10)
Defense Minister Antonio Martino on June 9 says to Corriere della Sera, "I feared the worst. I expected any time the news of their killing... I was sure that they would make us find the bodies on election eve... It was for some time that I reflected over a military operation to free them. .. I hoped in a bit of luck..." [Was any money paid?] Not one lira."
On June 13, in an interview with Corriere della Sera General Kimmitt says, "Never heard this story of a ransom. Sounds ridiculous to me."
Commissioner Scelli of the CRI is quoted by L’Unita’ of June 8 as saying: "We went to bring help and the people have been thankful and friendly and they gave us the strength never to give up in the past two months, to create that just consensus that would allow the liberation of the hostages....There was no direct negotiation with an emissary." Scelli tells ANSA: "Neither the government, nor the secret services, nor the embassy, have paid any ransom. The real problem is that too many people outside the institutions of govenment have entered the situation, muddying the waters....silence was the key." (ANSA, June 11) However, on the same date, according to La Repubblica, Scelli says that the matter could have been solved in twenty days, if there had not been certain parties offering 15 millions for the hostages. Il Manifesto of June 12 quotes Scelli saying: "Too many shysters, too many characters just landed in Iraq, who knows under what auspices, pretending to have relations they did not have, throwing on the scale money that no one had ever asked." So there it is once again, an official Italian source admitting that there were messengers bearing sacks of currency. Are we to believe those were philanthropists? Are we to believe those were not agents for some personage in Rome?
According to Il Manifesto of June 12, Scelli, on Friday June 11, said on Italian televison: "We were the principal interlocutors. Saturday something got stuck. The hours passed, no other message came, no one knew anything, and Monday we have the liberation by force." Problem: the raid took place Tuesday. If he had said June 7, you could assume he meant June 8. But he said Monday, in the context of a very important and very recent series of events in his life. Unless the reporter made a transcription error, Scelli’s words suggest that there may have been two raids, one on Monday and one on Tuesday.
Vice Premier Fini is quoted by La Stampa as saying: "The hostages have been freed because the Italian government has remained firm, saying that with terrorists, one does not deal or talk." Fini also tells Radio Anch’io: "There has been no negotiation for the freeing of the three kidnapped Italians. If Gino Strada has evidence, let him present it." (ANSA, June 11)
Strada, in an interview with La Stampa of June 12, answers: "Evidence? I never spoke of evidence...I repeat what I said before...Twelve days ago...our mediator asked whether the man who was offering nine million dollars was our representative."
THE DISINFORMATION
Defense Minister Antonio Martino on June 9 says to Corriere della Sera, "I also thought that an Italian might be among the managers of the kidnapping." During the electoral campaign, Italian television had spinned the tale of a connection between the Italian anti-war movement and the insurgents. Quoting from the TV show Porta a Porta, "an Italian presence is evident in AlQaeda and the terrorists." In other words, some Italian connected to AlQaeda was running the hostage situation, in order to influence the Italian elections. On different TV shows, charges of treason were launched against the left, including anyone who would refer to combatants in Iraq as insurgents, instead of terrorists, which is the politically correct expression allowed in Italy.
Interior Minister Pisanu declares: "Some revolutionary movements have chosen a private initiative, inserting themselves into the negotiations to release the hostages." (ANSA June 12) He also attacks unnamed "con men, both Italian and foreign, who have tried to profit, financially and politically." ( La Stampa, June 13) Now how could such "con men" profit, if there were no sacks of cash from Italy being passed around?
After the raid, Premier Berlusconi, commenting upon the opposition’s doubts, declares that their polemics have reached a maximum level of "cialtroneria." (ANSA June 12) A "cialtrone" is a low despicable scoundrel. La Stampa of June 12 quotes Berlusconi as charging the opposition with "masochistic, paranoic, and shameful anti-patriotism." The rulers are raging at the left, when all they need, to deflate any conspiracy theory, is some openness: allowing the hostages to be interviewed, and releasing video and photos.
Instead of openness, the government takes the disinformation route. The evening of June 10, two days before the election, the inquiring magistrates of the Procura di Roma receive from the Ministry of Interior the evidence that the kidnappers had decided to kill the hostages. It’s a death sentence announcement, delivered as a message posted on a religious Islamic website based in Dallas, Texas. Its writer seems interested in insulting President Berlusconi, but there is no explicit demand for the withdrawal of Italian forces. Within the hour, the story is on ANSA, the Italian news agency, and millions of Italians hear that the hostages were to be killed "to give an answer to the arrogant Italian president Berlusconi." Il Giornale, owned by the Berlusconi family, tells us on June 11 that "ANSA confirms an atrocious suspicion: the three Italian hostages, until three days ago in the hands of the Islamic beasts... were to be slaughtered today to influence the vote of tomorrow..."
The site of state-owned Italian radio and television is www.rainews24.it. On June 11, it tells us that the inquiring magistrates in Rome do consider the death sentence message to be genuine, for the following reasons: "The Brigade al Quds, the signatory of the document , is the same which assumed the paternity of the massacre in Saudi Arabia in which the Italian cook Antonio Amato was killed. Furthermore, the statement is signed on June 5. That concords with the statements separately given yesterday by... the three hostages...who on June 4 became convinced they would be killed." Problem: the message was posted not on June 5, but after the raid. All television networks in Italy are either run by the government or are owned by Premier Berlusconi. By election day, every voter has heard about how the Islamists wanted to "punish the arrogant Italian president." Very few have heard that the death sentence was posted after the liberation. That would be the equivalent of sending out the wedding invitations after the bride has eloped with another suitor.
La Repubblica of June 12 reports that, trying to determine the origin of the planned execution story, it approached the various Italian secret services and antiterrorism units, including State Police and Carabinieri. The answers of police generals and agency directors varied between "smiles" and comments like "of that story we really don’t want to know anything."
On June 11, the weeekly Panorama, owned by the Berlusconi family, gives a very detailed insider report on the hostage story. It claims that, as a result of diplomatic approaches, the terrorists almost came to free the hostages in April. At that point, some interlopers, connected to AlQaeda and to leftist troublemakers in Italy, sabotaged the release. SISMI, Italian military intelligence, contrary to what its director Nicolo’ Pollari says (Corriere della Sera, June 16) discovered the kidnappers’ jail. The house was put under electronic surveillance, the Italian hostages were heard talking to each other, and Jerzy Kos was heard talking to himself, in Polish. The Italian government, fearful that the hostages would be killed, postponed a rescue attempt until when the kidnappers, at midnight on Sunday June 6, were heard arguing on whether to kill all the hostages or only one.
On June 18, Panorama accuses Gino Strada himself of offering money for the hostages. It also reports that the Polish rangers, contrary to what General Bieniek says (Corriere della Sera, June 9) took part in the raid, and that the jail was discovered not on June 6 or 7, but about May 26. Panorama also reveals who the traitors were amongst the insurgents. If this were true, the magazine’s publisher might be charged with treason, for compromising current or future intelligence operations to save other hostages. Fortunately, the articles are fantasy. Clearly, the idea is to create a smoke screen of confused extravagant tales and to place Gino Strada in the spotlight, in order to allow Berlusconi to quietly leave the stage, without having to explain the contradictions in the official story.
Gino Strada sums it all up: "A raid in which no shots are fired and no one dies is pretty unlikely ...The Americans came, rang at the door, and took what the Italian government had already paid for." (Corriere della Sera, June 11)
PATRIOTISM AND INTELLIGENCE
In Rome, at the news of the hostages’ liberation, there was much patriotic fervor and flag waving. Politicians tried to involve the intelligence community in their own happy version of events, issuing congratulations to SISMI, military intelligence, for their part in the hostage liberation. A week later, after the election, the Italian services were distancing themselves from the official story.
As the United States Senate has the Intelligence Committee, so the Italian Parliament has COPACO, the Parliamentary Committee of Control on the Security Services. It held a hearing, at which testified Nicolo’ Pollari, the Director of SISMI. After the hearing, the president of COPACO, Enzo Bianco, sitting next to Pollari, said: "The operation was imagined, directed, and wanted under complete responsibility of the United States. Italy limited herself to say, ’it’s fine with us.’ " Asked about the role of the Italian services in the discovery of the terrorists’ lair, Bianco answered: "The responsibility for the event is in American hands." (Corriere della Sera, June 16)
It’s quite normal, for a politician who is drowning in a scandal, to try to save himself by blaming the secret services. A major function of intelligence chiefs is to know how far to go protecting today’s political leaders, and to know when to cut them loose, in the national interest. The services are staffed by men of the right, who often have long term historical perspectives. Politicians tend to be shortsighted men, blessed with a vision that may range, on clear days, as far as the next election. Directors of intelligence read history books, politicians read spy novels.
Italian leaders now feign offense at the suggestion that ransom was paid. They do not know that delivering currency to kidnappers has illustrious precedents: Presidents Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Hamilton, they all paid ransom, barrels of silver dollars, to the Barbary Pirates. Premier Berlusconi, who is famous for his devotion to America and for his love and admiration of President Bush, ought to be delighted; he ought to be proud of having so much in common with the Founding Fathers.
Did the plan work out? It was not a clean, quiet job, using backchannels, like the arrangements carried out by Republican Party operatives for the 1968 and 1980 elections. Still, there was perfect timing, the hostage rescue came four days before the election, and mobilized the center-right electorate. On the very evening of the rescue, announced after 2pm, 80% of Italians knew about it. Many, who would not have bothered to vote, went to the polls in a mood of patriotic celebration, and voted for the government coalition. Others marched to the polls trembling with rage at the left, for their treasonable doubts about the war and the hostage rescue, to say nothing of their youth, hair styles, and bad manners.
Actually, only the pacifist left, a very small section of the opposition, challenged the government. The rest of the opposition, the reformist left, did not call the government’s bluff, rejecting the idea of making the war and the staged raid the key issue in the last days of the electoral campaign. The grand Iraqi development contracts promised by Berlusconi had not materialized, unemployment and deficit had worsened, the caskets had began rolling home, but the release of three, still poor, little soldiers of fortune, somehow gave validation to the war.
It was an October Surprise in June. It worked out fine for the former neofascist party of Vice Premier Fini, which gained votes. It worked, but not as well, for Premier Berlusconi, whose party did not collapse. It worked marvelously for Marco Rizzo, of the Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, who won big. Interviewed by Corriere della Sera, Rizzo said: ’Four comrades, they always try to get me to pay for dinner... I said: if they free the hostages, it’s going to happen in the week before the election, and they said: "No, no... I’ll bet you on that!" So I won four dinners... ’