The myth of strategic supremacy

The United States total support for Israel’s war in Lebanon is both alarming and mystifying. How can it be explained? Ties of sentiment undoubtedly play a part, as does the work of the hydra-headed Jewish lobby in convincing Washington opinion that US and Israeli interests are identical and that they face the same enemy in the shape of “Islamic terrorism†.
Mention must also be made of the important role of the ubiquitous neocons, both inside and outside the Bush administration, in shaping US foreign policy in a pro-Israeli direction.

However, this does not seem enough to account for the unconditional alignment of the United States with Israel, for its refusal to demand an immediate ceasefire, for the hurried dispatch to Israel of still more US weapons, and for the whole thrust of secretary of state Condoleezza Rice’s diplomacy, which is directed at ensuring Israel’s victory and the defeat and disarmament of its enemies, notably Hezbollah.

The cost of this policy has already been enormous. Lebanon’s entire civilian infrastructure has been shattered, perhaps 600 of its citizens killed and a million displaced, the whole amounting to a massive national and humanitarian catastrophe. On the other side, at least 40 Israelis have been killed, many more wounded by Hezbollah rocket attacks, and very considerable damage and disruption inflicted on the economy and on people’s lives, especially in northern Israel.

The indirect costs are also very great. Hate for Israel is now so widespread and deep-seated as to put in doubt its long-term acceptance in the region. Washington’s reputation in the Arab and Muslim world has been tremendously degraded, with dangerous consequences for its future interests and the security of its citizens.

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the Gulf states and Jordan, traditionally close to the United States, have been angered by a war that has gravely embarrassed them in the eyes of their public opinion and forced them to rethink their dependence on the United States. What is US friendship worth, they ask, if the protection of Israel overrides all other considerations?

In view of these colossal costs, what then drives the war?

The explanation, I believe, lies in the severe shocks that both the United States and Israel have suffered in the past five or six years — shocks that undermine their strategy supremacy and that confront them with the painful possibility of having to revise their cherished strategic doctrines.
The Israeli-US war in Lebanon may perhaps be best understood as a desperate attempt to reverse this most unwelcome trend.

For the United States, the shocks include al-Qaida’s mass-casualty attacks of 9/11 on the US mainland and the failure to master the insurgency in Iraq, which looks more and more each day like a US strategic defeat.

For Israel, the shocks include being forced out of southern Lebanon by Hezbollah in 2000 after a 22-year occupation, and Hamas’ suicide bombings during the second intifada, which killed nearly 1,000 Israelis (against Palestinian casualties of more than 4,000).

To these shocks must now be added Israel’s evident difficulty in crushing Hezbollah despite Israel’s overwhelming military strength.

All these developments point to a single conclusion — asymmetric warfare by non-state actors has humiliated the United States and Israel and eroded their deterrent capability. Their strategic supremacy has been shown to be a myth.
As well as the devastating inroads made by non-state actors, Iran is now defiantly pursuing a nuclear programme that, if diverted to military use, could break Israel’s regional monopoly of atomic weapons. Iran has also pledged its military support for Syria if the latter is attacked by Israel or the United States, ostensibly for backing Hezbollah and Hamas but in reality because Syria too refuses to bend to US-Israeli dictates.

Ze’ev Schiff, Israel’s well-known defence analyst, has succinctly described Israel’s security dilemma as it wrestles with the new environment.
This is what he wrote last week: “Hezbollah and what this terrorist organisation symbolises must be destroyed at any price. This is the only option that Israel has. We cannot afford a situation of strategic parity between Israel and Hezbollah. If Hezbollah does not experience defeat in this war, this will spell the end of Israel’s deterrence against its enemies."
This is a perfect expression of Israel’s mindset, shared unfortunately by many in the United States. Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, well-known for its pro-Israeli views, wrote in the Financial Times of July 26: “A ceasefire under any circumstances other than Hezbollah’s complete disarmament would be construed as another victory for the terrorist agenda."

There we have it again. For both Mr Schiff and Ms Pletka and many like them, Israel’s opponents are all terrorists. Israel’s deterrent power must reign supreme. Israel must be free to hit its neighbours but never to be hit back. The United States must be free to smash a major Arab state but never suffer the consequences.

Is it not time for Israel and its superpower ally to think again? What, after all, is wrong with strategic parity? Why do they insist on the unattainable goal of strategic supremacy? Why not a balance of power between Israel and its neighbours, and indeed between the United States and emerging powers such as China, Russia, Brazil and India, not to mention the European Union? Can Israel’s security be achieved only at the cost of the insecurity — and the periodic destruction — of its neighbours? Do not the Palestinians and the Lebanese need protection against Israel at least as much if not rather more than Israel needs protection against Hamas and Hezbollah?

Does not history prove that a balance of power keeps the peace while an imbalance causes war because the stronger party will always seek to impose its will by force?

Will Israel and the United States never learn this lesson or must the rest of the world simply accept to be bombed into submission?

Patrick Seale is a leading writer on the Middle East, and the author of The Struggle for Syria; also, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East; and Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire.