Strain Theory in Iraq; an alternative strategy to militarism

The death of dogma is the birth of reality.
Immanuel Kant

During the latter part of the 90s the Neocons distilled their intentions into dogmas and ideologies aimed to spread democracy and Capitalism across the globe, particularly in the Middle East. Consequently, democracy, which had previously existed as a largely non-ideological phenomenon and written with a lower case ’d’ became an ideological set of beliefs written with an upper case ’D’. From Greece to Rome to the hinterlands, where democracy gradually made headway, it developed from the inside out, from the bottom to the top, from the hearts of individuals inspired by the Spirit of Freedom as opposed to an outside force attempting to impose secularism, modernity, and market-driven values all wrapped up in a package called Democracy. But such has been the Administration’s operating paradigm, despite the lack of a precedent.

Obviously such foolish idealism has failed for reasons too numerous to mention here or in a few dozen books for that matter. The aim of reconfiguring Iraq, or Haiti, for example, may have been "in the national interest" but it was certainly never in the ballpark of reality. Odd, when you think about the source of such folly, which was prescribed by a group of rather staid, socially repressed, overly starched and consistently coddled individuals who took great pleasure scolding liberals for their excesses and immoderate behavior for decades. If Clinton lowered the bar of public ethics with back office fellatio, the Neocons subsequently lowered ethical standards to a disgraceful new low, doing great harm to the public trust in the process. How is it that any of them still have the legitimacy and the nerve to persist with their misbegotten plans, now via a "surge"?

One of the key strategic blunders of the American policy regarding the "War on Terror" is that it has not been, and could never be, a conventional war whereby standing armies face each other until one of them gains the upper hand and the other signs a treaty. This so-called "War" involves nation building and all of the sociological considerations, such as a nation’s infrastructure, prevailing sectarian values, cultural beliefs, tribal habituation, economic customs, that should be considered over and above sheer militaristic tactics and goals. Once the military did its job of formally defeating the Iraqi army - indeed, if such a thing was ever truly accomplished - then it was time for city planners, sociologists, mediation teams, educational experts, civilian and government police forces to shape the transformed society into a reasonably workable nation. Arguably, regardless of how successful such an effort would’ve been, odds are that Iraq would still be in a mess, but one with a basis for hope, albeit very limited.

For further elucidation see Rupert Smith’s "The Utility of Force," which illustrates the limits of traditional military means. As well educated, and in many cases as brilliant, as some recent military leaders have been, the role of reconstructing an entire nation far exceeds their capabilities and their training. And even if it didn’t, What nation is going to be content having a foreign military force run everyday affairs? How would it be possible, especially in a nation that was formed by imperialist ambitions and colonialist manipulators, for the people at large to not associate the new foreign occupiers with traditional colonialists?

Democracies run militaristically aren’t, by definition, democracies regardless of whether 100% of the people voted for their elected representatives. Proponents of continued occupation insist that the U.S. military is necessary to sustain order, but, indeed, its extended stay has been a key cause of mass destabilization. Applying sociologist Robert Merton’s Strain Theory makes this crystal clear.

(see:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strain...

According to the theory, society consists of four basic groups: Innovators, creative types who may bend the rules to stay ahead, Ritualists, common folks repeating the same behavior who are mostly conformists, Retreatists, who drop out, and Rebels, including terrorists. Essentially what causes individuals to move out of conformity and into criminality is the loss of norms and laws that once bound society into a workable unit.

In Iraq’s case, even though Hussein was a merciless leader, his rule - enforced by fear - was widely considered legitimate and thus served as a normative framework. A key part of that framework included the Baathists and Sunnis, who assumed comparative superiority, in part because they disproportionately had attained a higher degree of material success and to a lesser extent because they had successfully secularized themselves. That allowed them to taste some of the pleasures of modernity that more orthoprax Shiites have been reluctant to explore.

Once Hussein was toppled, however, the Sunni sensibility, which resonated with numerous twentieth century, Western concepts, ranging from Fascism to higher education, was subordinated and was therefore no longer legitimate. The Strain of suddenly experiencing an outside order that threatened their power base and economic opportunities suddenly shifted the group as a whole from Innovators and Ritualists into Retreatists and Rebels.

Since Islam doesn’t permit imbibing alcohol, the rate of Retreatists is lower than it would be in Western nations, such as Russia, where many of the discontent and malcontent drown their potential rebellion with 80 proof beverages. That means there’s a higher, more volatile percentage of Rebels seeking to undo the order that they believe robbed them and their society of legitimacy and opportunity.

Since The U.S. has remained in a militaristic stage, the lens through which events are analyzed differentiates good from bad in military vernacular, such as insurgents and terrorists. But in a true democratic court of law it would be nearly impossible to prove how the ruling political party in charge of a sovereign nation - the Baathists - were summarily disbanded based on the fallacy of WMDs and then, presto, became insurgents. Insurgents, such as the American revolutionary army or the IRA, customarily never enjoyed much power, which is what made them insurgents in the first place.

First and foremost, the Baathists and Sunnis have as a general rule become Rebels because of the illegitimate scheme that deposed their administration. Perceiving them as "insurgents" prompts outsiders to seek a military "victory" as opposed to understanding them as Merton’s Rebels seeking some form of restoring their legitimacy. In America, Merton’s ideas helped shaped affirmative action. Such a plan, designed for the Iraqi culture, could help restore a broader sense of legitimacy than the current "democracy" conveys. Granted, the Sunnis are a democratic minority, but since their rule was banished based on an illegal assault, i.e., the grounds for attack were not legitimate and the effort didn’t have international or U.N. backing, some form of remedial affirmative action is fully justified, even if it can’t garner "democratic" support within the Iraqi government.

If America’s going to continue acting like an empire, and the people at large aren’t motivated to stop such efforts, then it would be wise to incorporate the full spectrum of ideas and experts beyond sheer military might in order to ensure a much higher rate of success. What was done in Birmingham, Selma, and Jackson could, over time, serve as an operative model for helping Iraqis integrate their conflicted sects. Granted, the challenge is next to impossible, but it’s far more valuable than sending over more "smart" bombs and troops who can, at best, only temporarily contain the Rebel spirit, or, at worse, inspire it to become even more lethal.