Home > U.S. Considers New Covert Push Within Pakistan
Wars and conflicts Governments USA
by STEVEN LEE MYERS, DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON - President Bush’s senior national security
advisers are debating whether to expand the authority of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the military to
conduct far more aggressive covert operations in the
tribal areas of Pakistan.
The debate is a response to intelligence reports that Al
Qaeda and the Taliban are intensifying efforts there to
destabilize the Pakistani government, several senior
administration officials said.
Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and a number of President Bush’s top
national security advisers met Friday at the White House
to discuss the proposal, which is part of a broad
reassessment of American strategy after the
assassination 10 days ago of the Pakistani opposition
leader Benazir Bhutto. There was also talk of how to
handle the period from now to the Feb. 18 elections, and
the aftermath of those elections.
Several of the participants in the meeting argued that
the threat to the government of President Pervez
Musharraf was now so grave that both Mr. Musharraf and
Pakistan’s new military leadership were likely to give
the United States more latitude, officials said. But no
decisions were made, said the officials, who declined to
speak for attribution because of the highly delicate
nature of the discussions.
Many of the specific options under discussion are
unclear and highly classified. Officials said that the
options would probably involve the C.I.A. working with
the military’s Special Operations forces.
The Bush administration has not formally presented any
new proposals to Mr. Musharraf, who gave up his military
role last month, or to his successor as the army chief,
Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who the White House thinks
will be more sympathetic to the American position than
Mr. Musharraf. Early in his career, General Kayani was
an aide to Ms. Bhutto while she was prime minister and
later led the Pakistani intelligence service.
But at the White House and the Pentagon, officials see
an opportunity in the changing power structure for the
Americans to advocate for the expanded authority in
Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country. "After years of
focusing on Afghanistan, we think the extremists now see
a chance for the big prize - creating chaos in Pakistan
itself," one senior official said.
The new options for expanded covert operations include
loosening restrictions on the C.I.A. to strike selected
targets in Pakistan, in some cases using intelligence
provided by Pakistani sources, officials said. Most
counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have been
conducted by the C.I.A.; in Afghanistan, where military
operations are under way, including some with NATO
forces, the military can take the lead.
The legal status would not change if the administration
decided to act more aggressively. However, if the C.I.A.
were given broader authority, it could call for help
from the military or deputize some forces of the Special
Operations Command to act under the authority of the
agency.
The United States now has about 50 soldiers in Pakistan.
Any expanded operations using C.I.A. operatives or
Special Operations forces, like the Navy Seals, would be
small and tailored to specific missions, military
officials said.
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, who was on vacation
last week and did not attend the White House meeting,
said in late December that "Al Qaeda right now seems to
have turned its face toward Pakistan and attacks on the
Pakistani government and Pakistani people."
In the past, the administration has largely stayed out
of the tribal areas, in part for fear that exposure of
any American-led operations there would so embarrass the
Musharraf government that it could further empower his
critics, who have declared he was too close to
Washington.
Even now, officials say, some American diplomats and
military officials, as well as outside experts, argue
that American-led military operations on the Pakistani
side of the border with Afghanistan could result in a
tremendous backlash and ultimately do more harm than
good. That is particularly true, they say, if Americans
were captured or killed in the territory.
In part, the White House discussions may be driven by a
desire for another effort to capture or kill Osama bin
Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri. Currently,
C.I.A. operatives and Special Operations forces have
limited authority to conduct counterterrorism missions
in Pakistan based on specific intelligence about the
whereabouts of those two men, who have eluded the Bush
administration for more than six years, or of other
members of their terrorist organization, Al Qaeda,
hiding in or near the tribal areas.
The C.I.A. has launched missiles from Predator aircraft
in the tribal areas several times, with varying degrees
of success. Intelligence officials said they believed
that in January 2006 an airstrike narrowly missed
killing Mr. Zawahri, who had attended a dinner in
Damadola, a Pakistani village. But that apparently was
the last real evidence American officials had about the
whereabouts of their chief targets.
Critics said more direct American military action would
be ineffective, anger the Pakistani Army and increase
support for the militants. "I’m not arguing that you
leave Al Qaeda and the Taliban unmolested, but I’d be
very, very cautious about approaches that could play
into hands of enemies and be counterproductive," said
Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown
University. Some American diplomats and military
officials have also issued strong warnings against
expanded direct American action, officials said.
Hasan Askari Rizvi, a leading Pakistani military and
political analyst, said raids by American troops would
prompt a powerful popular backlash against Mr. Musharraf
and the United States.
In the wake of the American invasions of Iraq and
Afghanistan, many Pakistanis suspect that the United
States is trying to dominate Pakistan as well, Mr. Rizvi
said. Mr. Musharraf - who is already widely unpopular -
would lose even more popular support.
"At the moment when Musharraf is extremely unpopular, he
will face more crisis," Mr. Rizvi said. "This will
weaken Musharraf in a Pakistani context." He said such
raids would be seen as an overall vote of no confidence
in the Pakistani military, including General Kayani.
The meeting on Friday, which was not publicly announced,
included Stephen J. Hadley, Mr. Bush’s national security
adviser; Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff; and top intelligence officials.
Spokesmen for the White House, the C.I.A. and the
Pentagon declined to discuss the meeting, citing a
policy against doing so. But the session reflected an
urgent concern that a new Qaeda haven was solidifying in
parts of Pakistan and needed to be countered, one
official said.
Although some officials and experts have criticized Mr.
Musharraf and questioned his ability to take on
extremists, Mr. Bush has remained steadfast in his
support, and it is unlikely any new measures, including
direct American military action inside Pakistan, will be
approved without Mr. Musharraf’s consent.
"He understands clearly the risks of dealing with
extremists and terrorists," Mr. Bush said in an
interview with Reuters on Thursday. "After all, they’ve
tried to kill him."
The Pakistan government has identified a militant leader
with links to Al Qaeda, Baitullah Mehsud, who holds sway
in tribal areas near the Afghanistan border, as the
chief suspect behind the attack on Ms. Bhutto. American
officials are not certain about Mr. Mehsud’s complicity
but say the threat he and other militants pose is a new
focus. He is considered, they said, an "Al Qaeda
associate."
In an interview with foreign journalists on Thursday,
Mr. Musharraf warned of the risk any counterterrorism
forces - American or Pakistani - faced in confronting
Mr. Mehsud in his native tribal areas.
"He is in South Waziristan agency, and let me tell you,
getting him in that place means battling against
thousands of people, hundreds of people who are his
followers, the Mehsud tribe, if you get to him, and it
will mean collateral damage," Mr. Musharraf said.
The weeks before parliamentary elections - which were
originally scheduled for Tuesday - are seen as critical
because of threats by extremists to disrupt the vote.
But it seemed unlikely that any additional American
effort would be approved and put in place in that time
frame.
Administration aides said that Pakistani and American
officials shared the concern about a resurgent Qaeda,
and that American diplomats and senior military officers
had been working closely with their Pakistani
counterparts to help bolster Pakistan’s counterterrorism
operations.
Shortly after Ms. Bhutto’s assassination, Adm. William
J. Fallon, who oversees American military operations in
Southwest Asia, telephoned his Pakistani counterparts to
ensure that counterterrorism and logistics operations
remained on track.
In early December, Adm. Eric T. Olson, the new leader of
the Special Operations Command, paid his second visit to
Pakistan in three months to meet with senior Pakistani
officers, including Lt. Gen. Muhammad Masood Aslam,
commander of the military and paramilitary troops in
northwest Pakistan. Admiral Olson also visited the
headquarters of the Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force
of about 85,000 members recruited from border tribes
that the United States is planning to help train and
equip.
But the Pakistanis are still years away from fielding an
effective counterinsurgency force. And some American
officials, including Defense Secretary Gates, have said
the United States may have to take direct action against
militants in the tribal areas.
American officials said the crisis surrounding Ms.
Bhutto’s assassination had not diminished the Pakistani
counterterrorism operations, and there were no signs
that Mr. Musharraf had pulled out any of his 100,000
forces in the tribal areas and brought them to the
cities to help control the urban unrest.
Carlotta Gall contributed reporting from Islamabad, and
David Rohde from New York.